Eight NATO Allies Are Looking Beyond US Weapons as Defence Spending Surges

Canada chose an Australian radar system over an American rival in June. It is buying Swedish early-warning aircraft and reviewing whether to purchase more US-made F-35 fighters or add Swedish Gripens instead. In Europe, governments are investing in alternatives to American air-defence systems and trying to expand their own weapons production.

These are still individual procurement decisions rather than a wholesale break with the US defence industry. But Reuters has identified at least eight NATO members – Canada, Poland, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Turkey, France and Germany – exploring ways to reduce aspects of their dependence on American weapons, technology and defence companies.

The shift is happening at the same time as NATO defence spending rises sharply. European members and Canada increased their combined military spending by 20% in 2025, driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as sustained pressure from President Donald Trump for allies to carry more of the cost of their own defence.

The result is more complicated than a simple transfer of military responsibility from Washington to Europe. Some of the additional spending will continue flowing to American companies. Some is being used specifically to make European and Canadian militaries less dependent on them.

Canada provides one of the clearest examples of how that works in practice. Its government selected a $1.7 billion Australian-made Arctic radar system in June after the supplier promised delivery years earlier than its American competitor. Reuters reports that Pentagon officials supported that decision because speed mattered.

Other Canadian choices have created more tension. Ottawa is buying Swedish early-warning aircraft rather than an American alternative and is reviewing the remainder of its planned F-35 purchase. Canada has committed to an initial batch of the US fighter, but its government says no decision has been made on whether the rest of the requirement will be filled entirely by F-35s or partly by another aircraft such as Sweden’s Gripen.

That is diversification rather than separation. Canada will continue operating American equipment and working closely with the US military, but it is examining whether every major capability needs to come from the same supplier.

Air defence shows why European governments are asking similar questions.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has demonstrated the value of America’s Patriot missile system while simultaneously exposing Europe’s dependence on it. Patriot batteries require interceptors, maintenance, components and continuing production from a supply chain that European governments do not control.

Ukraine and nine European allies have now launched the Freyja project to develop an alternative anti-ballistic missile system. The aim is not merely to produce another missile with similar capabilities. The consortium wants a system that can be manufactured more quickly and cheaply than Patriot while keeping control of production in Europe.

That difference becomes important during a prolonged war. Owning a weapons system does not necessarily mean controlling the ability to sustain it. Ammunition has to be replenished, damaged equipment repaired, software updated and replacement components manufactured. Dependence on an overseas supplier can therefore continue for decades after the original purchase.

Europe cannot remove that dependence quickly even if governments decide they want to. Modern weapons take years to develop and manufacturing capacity takes years to expand. American equipment is already deeply embedded across NATO forces, and replacing it simply to achieve political independence could be expensive and militarily counterproductive.

The F-35 demonstrates the limit particularly clearly. Lockheed Martin told Reuters it continues to see strong NATO demand, with Poland and Finland due to receive their first aircraft this year and Canada and Germany following. Germany also says American contractors continue to account for a significant share of its defence procurement.

The current picture is therefore not one of European governments abandoning American weapons. It is one of governments increasingly treating excessive dependence on a single foreign supplier as a risk that should be reduced where credible alternatives exist.

Washington has noticed. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby argued publicly in July that allies should work with the American defence industrial base rather than attempt to replicate or replace it. NATO’s rapidly expanding defence budgets represent an enormous potential market, and decisions made now can determine supply relationships lasting for decades.

Trump has repeatedly argued that NATO allies should spend more on defence and has taken credit for helping push them towards higher spending commitments. The White House says his approach has strengthened the alliance by forcing members to accept greater responsibility, while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has also credited Trump with helping drive the increase.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains another major cause. European governments began increasing defence budgets because a large conventional war had returned to the continent, exposed shortages in ammunition and air defence, and demonstrated how quickly military stocks could be consumed.

Those two pressures now reinforce each other. Russia gives Europe an immediate reason to rearm. Uncertainty about Washington gives some governments a reason to ask where the new weapons should come from.

A Europe with larger armed forces, deeper ammunition reserves and greater ability to defend its own territory could require fewer American troops and resources. The Pentagon is still reviewing the US force posture in Europe, including a possible reduction of roughly 25,000 personnel from the more than 81,000 currently stationed there.

Reduced military dependence could also alter American influence over European defence decisions.

Washington’s position inside NATO rests on much more than weapons exports. The US provides capabilities Europe cannot readily reproduce, maintains tens of thousands of troops on the continent and remains central to the alliance’s command structure and nuclear deterrent.

Europe is also strategically useful to the United States. Reuters found Washington continuing to invest heavily in European bases even while reviewing troop numbers. US tankers operated from Romania during the Iran war, while American bombers have used British bases for operations against Iranian targets. Spain hosts facilities giving US forces access to the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Middle East and North Africa.

That is why procurement decisions should not be confused with the future of NATO itself. Buying a Swedish aircraft or developing a European missile does not end the military relationship with Washington, just as buying an F-35 does not guarantee permanent political alignment.

The more useful measure will be what exists five or ten years from now.

If European alternatives remain development programmes while governments continue buying American systems for the capabilities that matter most, today’s diversification will have changed relatively little. If those programmes produce operational weapons, factories capable of supplying them at scale, independent maintenance networks and militaries able to sustain operations without relying on American supply chains, the balance will have changed materially.

For now, both trends are happening together. NATO allies are spending more on defence, and American manufacturers continue to win major orders. At the same time, at least eight members are looking for ways to ensure that more defence spending also buys them greater control over their own military capabilities.

Whether that becomes genuine strategic independence will be decided not by procurement announcements, but by what those countries can eventually build, maintain and operate without Washington.

Sources

• Reuters – Trump’s pressure on NATO is reshaping Europe’s defences